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1 Introduction	
	
Over	 the	past	decade,	 the	diffusion	of	digital	 technologies	across	emerging	economies	has	spurred	
expectations	of	transformative	change	in	several	fields,	from	agriculture	to	health	to	education.	The	
adoption	of	innovations	such	as	the	internet	and	mobile	telephony	is	regarded	by	many	governments	
and	development	agencies	as	an	opportunity	to	revamp	strategies	to	advance	human	development	
that	have	hitherto	fallen	short	of	delivering	on	their	promises.	At	the	same	time,	private	actors	see	
the	penetration	of	digital	connectivity	at	the	Bottom-of-the-Pyramid	(BoP)	as	a	lever	to	expand	their	
customer	base.	Whether	these	aspects	are	aligned	or	in	contrast	with	each	other	still	remains	to	be	
seen	and	is	at	the	centre	of	a	conversation	involving	a	variety	of	stakeholders.	
	
This	working	paper	seeks	to	engage	with	the	above-mentioned	debate	by	teasing	out	the	relationship	
between	the	new	and	fast	emerging	possibilities	to	make	social	protection	payments	through	digital	
delivery	mechanisms	 and	 the	 related	 pursuit	 of	 the	 policy	 goal	 of	 financial	 inclusion.	 Its	 aim	 is	 to	
provide	an	overview	of	dominant	perspectives,	policies	and	operational	and	regulatory	approaches	
that	are	shaping	existing	initiatives	to	digitise	social	protection	programmes	across	the	Global	South.	
It	 focuses	on	Government-to-person	(G2P)	transfers	and	reviews	both	grey	and	academic	 literature	
to	take	stock	of	how	it	addresses	the	following	questions:	
	
• To	what	extent	do	the	transformations	brought	about	by	the	digitisation	of	G2P	programmes		
contribute	to	facilitating	poor	and	vulnerable	people’s	access	to	formal	financial	services?	
• What	are	the	key	operational	and	regulatory	issues	emerging	from	the	evidence	base?	
	
It	 is	based	on	 the	 review	of	107	works	 (peer-reviewed	articles,	 industry	 reports,	policy	papers	and	
blog	 posts)	 discussing	 specific	 aspects	 of	 financial	 inclusion	 and	 digital	 G2P	 programmes	 and	
analysing	case	studies.	The	materials	were	mostly	sourced	from	academic	online	libraries	and	Google	
Scholar,	using	primarily	 the	keywords	 “financial	 inclusion”	 “digital	G2P”,	 “digital	 social	protection”.	
Further	 keywords	 used	 for	 the	 search	 were:	 “digital	 financial	 services”,	 “DFS”,	 “digitisation”	 and	
“payment	 ecosystem”.	 Moreover,	 the	 websites	 of	 the	 following	 organisations	 working	 on	 digital	
financial	 services	 and	 social	 protection	 were	 consulted:	 Bill	 and	Melissa	 Gates	 Foundation,	 CGAP,	
Better	than	Cash	Alliance,	GSMA,	FSDAfrica,	Mastercard	Foundation,	World	Bank	and	UNCDF.		
	
The	 category	 of	 social	 protection	 encompasses	 both	 government	 and	 donor-supported	 initiatives	
addressing	poor	and	vulnerable	 individuals	through	transfers	aimed	at	smoothing	consumption	and	
increasing	 resilience	 against	 livelihood	 risks1.	 Their	 long-term	goal	 is	 to	 empower	 socially	 excluded	
and	marginalized	individuals	(Devereux	and	Sabates-Wheeler,	2007).	Cash	transfers	are	a	typology	of	
payments	performed	by	both	state	and	non-state	actors	in	a	situation	of	emergency	(such	as	in	the	
aftermath	 of	 a	 humanitarian	 disaster	 or	 during	 a	 drought)	 or	 as	 a	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 social	 policy	
strategy.	They	can	be	either	conditional	on	the	fulfilment	of	specific	requirements	(such	as	education,	
health	and	nutrition)	or	on	the	beneficiaries	providing	labour	(CCT);	or	unconditional	(UCT).	They	can	
also	 be	 either	 universal	 or	 specifically	 targeting	 population	 segments	 considered	 particularly	
vulnerable.	 During	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	 cash	 transfers	 have	 gradually	 drawn	 the	 interest	 of	
policymakers	and	development	practitioners	as	a	cost-effective	 instrument	 to	“decrease	chronic	or	
shock-induced	poverty,	address	social	 risk	and	reducing	economic	vulnerability”	 (Samson,	2010:	2),	
taking	over	 the	physical	delivery	of	 food	 to	poor	households	as	 the	dominant	approach	within	 the	
policy	 field	 of	 social	 protection.	 This	 shift	 has	 been	 driven	 by	 a	 growing	 awareness	 that,	 among	
																																								 																				
1	 Social	 protection	 is	 typically	 divided	 into	 two	 subfields:	 social	 insurance	 and	 social	 assistance.	 The	 former	
includes	contributory	programmes	aimed	at	mitigating	the	impact	of	risks.	The	latter	encompasses	schemes	to	
reduce	inequalities	and	sustain	the	consumption	levels	of	poor	households	(Skoufias	et	al.,	2010).	Most	of	the	
examples	used	in	this	paper	fall	in	the	social	assistance	category.	
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vulnerable	populations,	cash	transfers	present	less	logistical	challenges	than	food	delivery	(Radcliffe,	
2016),	 increase	 the	agency	and	 reduce	 the	 stigma	of	marginalised	 individuals	and	enhance	 income	
for	poor	households,	with	positive	effects	on	education,	nutrition	and	health,	and,	in	general,	on	the	
achievement	of	a	broad	range	of	development	outcomes	(Arnold	et	al.,	2011;	Babajanian	and	Hagen-
Zanker,	2012;	Barca	et	al.,	2013;	Dissanayake	et	al.,	2012).	G2P	payments,	the	focus	of	this	working	
paper,	concern	the	transfer	of	social	benefits	performed	by	the	state2.	However,	 the	private	sector	
plays	 a	 critical	 role	 in	 the	 digitisation	 of	 these	 programmes,	 providing	 technical	 and	 operational	
capabilities	to	create	and	manage	the	necessary	infrastructure.		
	
This	 changing	 configuration	of	 public-private	partnerships	 (PPP)	 raises	 questions	on	 the	ownership	
and	usage	of	beneficiaries’	data	for	either	administrative	or	commercial	purposes.	These	goals	have	
been	 increasingly	 entangled.	 Indeed,	 in	 recent	 years,	 the	 social	 protection	 agenda	 has	 intersected	
with	 that	 of	 financial	 inclusion.	 This	 concept	 has	 gained	 centre-stage	 following	 the	 2005	 UN	
International	 Year	 of	 Microcredit	 (UNCDF,	 2006)	 and	 has	 since	 become	 integrated	 into	 the	
development	strategy	of	most	emerging	economies.	The	core	aim	of	financial	inclusion	is	to	facilitate	
‘access	 for	 all	 to	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 financial	 services	 –	 savings,	 credit,	 insurance,	 and	 payments	 –	
provided	 responsibly	 and	 sustainably	 by	 a	 range	 of	 providers	 in	 a	 well-regulated	 environment’	
(Porter,	2015).	The	policies	and	the	approaches	to	achieve	this	goal	are	currently	at	the	centre	of	a	
conversation	 involving	 a	 variegated	 assemblage	 of	 players	 (Schwittay,	 2011):	 state	 governments,	
central	 banks,	 development	 agencies,	 the	 payment	 industry,	 telecommunication	 companies,	
consultative	 organisations	 such	 as	 Alliance	 for	 Financial	 Inclusion	 (AFI),	 CGAP,	 Better	 Than	 Cash	
Alliance	and	GSMA.	This	conversation	revolves	around	the	idea	that	having	access	to	formal	financial	
services	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 help	 build	 resilience	 to	 cope	 with	 sudden	 economic	 shocks,	 smooth	
consumption	and	lay	the	groundwork	for	upward	social	mobility	(Demirguc-Kunt	et	al.,	2014;	Smith	
et	al.	2015;	Zinns	and	Weil,	2016)3.	The	influence	of	corporate-philanthropic	entities	such	as	the	Bill	
and	 Melinda	 Gates	 Foundation	 and	 MasterCard	 Foundation	 (Gabor	 and	 Brooks,	 2016)	 over	 the	
debate	on	 financial	 inclusion	has	 translated	 into	an	emphasis	on	 the	 role	of	 innovation	 in	bringing	
financial	services	to	the	poor	(Beck	et	al.,	2015;	Owens,	2013;	Duncombe	and	Boateng,	2009).		
	
The	 convergence	 of	 social	 protection	 and	 financial	 inclusion	 thus	 takes	 place	 against	 a	 backdrop	
shaped	 by	 a	 reappraisal	 of	 current	 approaches	 to	 cash	 transfers,	 the	 rapid	 diffusion	 of	 digital	
innovations	across	the	Global	South	and	the	growing	commitment	of	resources	to	financially	include	
the	38	percent	of	the	world’s	adult	population	(particularly	women,	informal	workers,	rural	dwellers)	
with	limited	or	no	access	to	formal	financial	services	(Demirgüc-Kant	and	Klapper,	2012;	Johnson	and	
Williams,	2016;	Schwittay,	2011,	2014).	Several	countries	are	currently	rolling	out	pilot	initiatives	to	
shift	 from	manual	 to	digital	G2P	disbursement,	with	mixed	 results4.	Given	 the	early	 stage	of	 these	
programmes,	 the	 evidence	 base	 is	 still	 limited.	However,	 it	 offers	 insights	 that	 can	 help	 anticipate	
future	trends	and	identify	possible	challenges.		
	
Chapter	2	discusses	the	link	of	digital	G2P	and	financial	inclusion	by	examining	the	argument	behind	
cash	 transfers,	 the	 shift	 to	 digital	 payments,	 the	 benefits	 of	 digital	 G2P	 for	 efficiency	 and	
transparency	and	the	opportunities	and	limits	 in	advancing	a	financial	 inclusion	strategy	as	hitherto	
																																								 																				
2	G2P	payments	include	also	grant	disbursements,	salary	and	stipend	payments.		
3	The	principles	of	the	financial	inclusion	agenda	are	enshrined	in	the	‘Maya	declaration’,	subscribed	in	2011	by	
regulatory	institutions	have	from	76	countries	committing	to	support	financial	literacy,	digital	financial	services	
(electronic	 payments,	mobile	 financial	 services	 and	 agent	 banking),	 ‘proportional’	 financial	 sector	 regulation	
and	FI	data.	
4	According	to	the	GSMA,	the	MNO	industry	association,	most	digital	G2P	initiatives	are	currently	being	rolled	
out	 in	 South	 Asia	 (53%),	 followed	 by	 Sub-Saharan	 Africa	 (28%)	 and	 Latin	 America	 &	 the	 Caribbean	 (19%)	
(Schulist,	2016).	 In	nine	developing	countries,	 two	thirds	or	more	of	 the	recipients	of	G2P	transfer	payments	
are	reported	to	receive	their	payments	into	an	account,	while	in	15	developing	countries	the	rate	is	between	40	
and	61%	(Demirguc-Kunt	et	al.,	2015).	
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emerged	from	the	evidence.	Chapter	3	focuses	on	the	operational	aspects	of	digital	G2P,	discussing	
the	 infrastructure	 through	which	 the	 payments	 are	made	 and	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 beneficiaries	 are	
verified,	 new	 frameworks	 of	 public-private	 partnerships	 (PPP)	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 digital	
payment	 ecosystem.	 Chapter	 4	 gleans	 the	 main	 regulatory	 issues	 in	 digital	 G2P	 programmes	 and	
aiming	 at	 facilitating	 the	 processing	 and	 the	 transfer	 of	 the	 payments	 while	 fulfilling	 Anti-Money	
Laundering/Combating	 the	 Financing	 of	 Terrorism	 (AML/CFT)	 requirements	 and	 safeguarding	
citizens’	rights.	The	conclusions	offer	insights	for	further	research.	
	
	
2 Digital	G2P	and	financial	inclusion	
2.1	 From	manual	to	digital	
	
In	 recent	 years,	 cash	 transfers	 have	 emerged	 as	 a	 key	 policy	 instrument	 to	 advance	 the	 social	
protection	agenda	of	many	developing	economies.	A	recent	ODI	review	of	the	impact	of	cash	transfer	
programmes	 has	 counted	 about	 130	 low-	 and	middle-income	 countries	 that	 have	 implemented	 at	
least	 one	 unconditional	 cash	 transfer	 (UCT)	 programme,	 while	 63	 countries	 run	 at	 least	 one	
conditional	cash	transfer	 (CCT)	programme	(Bastagli	et	al.	2016).	The	number	of	programmes	 is	on	
the	 rise	 in	 Sub-Saharan	 Africa,	 where	 there	 are	 currently	 40	 countries	 with	 at	 least	 one	 UCT	
programmes,	up	from	20	in	2010	(Honorati	et	al.,	2015).	The	evidence	collected	so	far	points	at	a	link	
between	cash	transfers	and	reduction	in	monetary	poverty	and	showing	an	overall	 improvement	in	
health	 services,	 dietary	 diversity	 and	 anthropometric	 measures,	 although	 to	 different	 extents	
according	 to	 the	 programme	 (Bastagli	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 The	 preliminary	 impact	 assessments	 of	 these	
programmes	 also	 highlight	 the	 positive	 effect	 of	 cash	 transfers	 on	 savings,	 on	 livestock	 ownership	
and/or	purchase,	and	use	and/or	purchase	of	agricultural	inputs,	although	this	positive	impact	is	“not	
universal	to	all	programmes	or	to	all	types	of	livestock	and	inputs”	(ibid.:	8).	
	
But	 the	 importance	 of	 cash	 transfers	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 smoothing	 consumption	 and	 increasing	
resilience	 to	 temporary	shocks.	Brune	 (2016),	 for	 instance,	 suggests	 that	cash	 transfers	can	sustain	
self-reliance	 and	 create	 a	 pathway	 out	 of	 poverty.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 example	 of	 Bangladesh	 Rural	
Advancement	Committee's	(BRAC)	 Income	Generation	for	Vulnerable	Group	Development	(IGVGD)5	
Programme,	 Barrientos	 and	 Scott	 (2008)	 argue	 that,	 when	 linked	 to	 savings	 and	 credit,	 social	
transfers	 can	 enable	 recipients	 to	 invest	 in	 human	 capital	 (through	 investments	 in	 health	 and	
education)	 and	 economic	 capital	 (through	 the	 accumulation	 of	 assets)6.	 Moreover,	 as	 argued	 by	
Priyadarshee	 et	 al.	 (2010),	 by	 guaranteeing	 a	 regular	 inflow	 of	 money,	 cash	 transfers	 have	 the	
potential	 to	 “make	 the	poor	 attractive	 customers	 to	microfinance	programmes	and	other	 financial	
service	 providers”	 (325).	 This	 argument	 directly	 links	 cash	 transfers	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 financial	
services,	 suggesting	 that	 beneficiaries	 of	 social	 payments	 are	 less	 risky	 borrowers	 for	 financial	
services	providers	(FSPs),	and	therefore	are	best	placed	to	access	formal	financial	services.	
		
																																								 																				
5	One	of	the	first	programmes	to	link	social	protection	to	microfinance,	IGVGD	was	initially	established	in	1975	
as	Vulnerable	Group	Feeding	(VGF).	It	was	then	revised	in	1985	with	the	help	of	BRAC	to	include	microcredit.	It	
is	 jointly	 led	 by	 the	 government	 of	 Bangladesh,	 the	World	 Food	 Program	 (WFP)	 and	 the	 Bangladesh	 Rural	
Advancement	Committee	(BRAC)	and	targets	poor	rural	women	by	linking	food	grain	assistance	to	skill	training	
and	 financial	 services	 in	 the	 form	of	 savings	 and	 credit.	Over	 a	 ten	 years	 period,	more	 than	 two-thirds	 of	 a	
million	women	who	have	benefitted	from	the	programme	have	“graduated”	from	absolute	poverty,	becoming	
microfinance	clients.	(Hashemi,	2001)	
6	The	evaluation	of	these	initiatives,	however,	is	nuanced	and	shows	that	several	factors	are	at	play.	Studies	on	
the	impact	of	Brazil	CCT	Bolsa	Familia	on	women’s	intra-household	decision	making,	for	instance,	have	stressed	
a	major	gap	between	urban	and	rural	areas,	highlighting	that,	while	in	the	cities	CCT	appears	to	strengthen	the	
agency	of	female	beneficiaries,	the	opposite	occurs	in	the	countryside	(Suarez	and	Libardoni,	2008;	de	Brauw	et	
al.,	2013).	
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More	recently,	cash	transfer	proponents	have	emphasised	the	role	of	G2P	payments	in	encouraging	
more	 ‘virtuous’	 financial	behaviours.	Reflecting	the	growing	 influence	of	 the	 ‘nudge	theory’	 (Thaler	
and	Sustein,	2008)	on	public	policy,	this	perspective	suggests	that	social	transfers	mitigate	the	mental	
fatigue	 induced	 in	 the	 poor	 by	 hard	 financial	 trade-off	 decisions	 (Fernald	 and	 Gunnar,	 2009)	 and	
contribute	to	behavioural	changes	by	helping	recipients	develop	the	habit	of	saving	(Zimmerman	and	
Holmes,	 2012;	 Arnold	 and	 Rhyne,	 2016).	 Some	 initiatives	 have	 explicitly	 associated	 cash	 transfers	
with	 financial	 literacy	 initiatives,	 not	 only	 to	 induce	 the	 recipients	 to	 save	 but	 also	 to	 direct	 them	
towards	 uses	 of	 the	 grants	 deemed	 more	 profitable	 and	 sustainable	 by	 the	 implementers	 of	 the	
programme	(DFID,	2009).		
	
The	 delivery	 of	 cash	 through	 traditional	 channels,	 however,	 presents	 several	 challenges.	 The	
management	 and	 administration	 of	 cash	 payments	 in	 challenging	 environments	 appear	 prone	 to	
inefficiencies	due	to	duplicates,	corruption	or	ghost	beneficiaries.	The	hiring	of	additional	staff	and	
security	to	perform	and	protect	the	transport	and	disbursement	of	the	money	weighs	on	the	budget	
(see	 for	 instance	 Jackelen	et	al.,	 2011).	Moreover,	most	manual	 cash	 transfer	programmes	 require	
recipients	 to	 travel	 to	 specific	 distribution	 points	 for	 them	 to	 collect	 their	 allowance.	 This	 entails	
costs	for	beneficiaries	in	terms	of	transport	and	lost	labour	time	and	put	at	disadvantage	those	with	
mobility	issues	(Vincent	and	Cull,	2011).	
	
As	manual	methods	of	 cash	 transfer	 have	 shown	downsides,	 policy	makers	 and	practitioners	 have	
started	 contemplating	 more	 innovative	 approaches.	 The	 backdrop	 of	 this	 reappraisal	 of	 the	
procedures	and	technologies	to	deliver	cash	is	the	dramatic	diffusion	of	ICTs	across	the	Global	South.	
The	 construction	 of	 strategic	 infrastructures,	 such	 as	 overseas	 fibre	 optic	 cables	 (Graham	 et	 al.,	
2015),	 and	 the	 falling	 cost	 of	 digital	 technologies	 have	 made	 the	 internet	 and	 mobile	 phones	
increasingly	 accessible	 to	an	unprecedented	number	of	 individuals	 and	 firms	 (Murphy	et	 al.,	 2014;	
Carmody,	 2012).	 Leveraging	 the	 expectations	 of	 greater	 efficiency	 and	 transparency	 afforded	 by	
digital	technologies,	governments	and	humanitarian	organisations	have	piloted	initiatives	to	replace	
the	traditional	disbursement	of	cash	with	the	transfer	of	funds	in	an	electronic	format.	State	agencies	
have	 partnered	 with	 established	 financial	 institutions,	 such	 as	 banks,	 and	 new	 types	 of	 financial	
service	providers,	such	as	mobile	network	operators	(MNO),	to	explore	the	possibility	to	funnel	G2P	
payments	directly	on	accounts	accessible	to	the	beneficiaries	by	using	either	debit	or	smart	cards7	or,	
in	contexts	in	which	mobile	money8	services	were	already	popular,	a	SIM	card.		
	
A	combination	of	multiple	factors	lies	behind	the	interest	towards	the	digitisation	of	social	protection	
programmes.	Most	 policy-related	 literature	 on	 social	 protection	 highlights	 the	 advantages	 for	 the	
state	 and	 for	 the	 beneficiaries,	 while	 the	 one	 on	 financial	 inclusion	 emphasises	 the	 long-term	
implications	of	cash	transfers	for	introducing	the	beneficiaries	to	a	wide	range	of	financial	services.		
	
2.2	 Benefits	for	the	state	and	citizens	
	
The	most	cited	benefits	for	the	state	are	efficiency	and	accountability.	Cash	transfers	are	expensive	
programmes,	 for	 states	with	 lean	 budgets	 and	 those	 facing	 donor	 fatigue.	 The	 costs	 are	 not	 only	
related	 to	 the	 transfers	 themselves	 but	 also	 to	 their	 management,	 and	 often	 spike	 beyond	 what	
initially	 planned	 because	 of	 leakages	 derived	 by	 duplicates,	 inefficiencies	 and	 fund	 diversion.	 The	
organisational	and	technological	arrangements	on	which	digital	cash	transfers	rely	can	enhance	the	
government’s	 capability	 to	 acquire	 data	 (Taylor	 and	 Schroeder,	 2014)	 and	 to	 verify	 that	 each	
																																								 																				
7	A	smart	card	is	a	plastic	card	with	an	electronic	chip	recording	biometric	and	other	data.	It	does	not	require	
the	recipient	to	have	to	remember	a	PIN	number	to	perform	operations,	with	benefits	for	those	with	 limited	
numeracy	or	literacy.	The	smart	card	may	function	also	offline.		
8	Kendall	et	al.	 (2012)	define	mobile	money	as	 “a	network	 infrastructure	 for	 storing	and	moving	money	 that	
facilitates	the	exchange	of	cash	and	electronic	value	between	various	actors”	(49)	
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payment	 is	 well	 targeted.	 As	 the	 transfer	 of	 electronic	 funds	 is	 essentially	 an	 information	 on	 the	
value,	 the	 recipient	 and	 the	 sender	 of	 a	 payment,	 digital	 technologies	make	 it	 possible	 to	 track	 a	
payment	 through	 the	 simultaneous	emission	of	metadata	 related,	 for	 instance,	 to	 the	 sending	and	
receiving	devices,	their	geographical	location	and	the	fulfillment	of	specific	requirements,	such	as	the	
entry	 of	 a	 PIN.	 The	 adoption	 of	 digital	 technologies	 is	 thus	 seen	 as	 instrumental	 to	 help	 poor	
countries	 and	 international	 development	organisations	 improve	 the	 implementation	of	 their	 social	
protection	agenda	(Hanlon	et	al.,	2010).		
	
The	 greater	 visibility	 of	 transaction	 flows	 depends	 on	 the	 digitisation	 of	 the	 recipients’	 data,	 the	
creation	of	de-duplication	checks,	the	setup	of	a	digital	management	information	systems	(MIS),	and	
the	implementation	of	authentication	mechanisms	for	beneficiaries	through	either	biometrics,	where	
available,	 or	 card	 and	 personal	 identification	 number	 (PIN)	 readers	 (UNCDF,	 2017).	 Lindert	 et	 al,	
(2007),	 for	 instance,	 suggest	 that	 the	 usage	 of	 a	 swipe	 card	 and	 agent	 banking	 to	 transfer	 social	
payments	 of	 the	 Bolsa	 Família	 social	 welfare	 programme	 to	 over	 12.4	million	 beneficiaries	 across	
Brazil	has	reduced	administrative	costs	from	14.7	percent	to	2.4	percent	of	the	total	grant	value.	In	
Mexico,	shifting	to	digital	payments	has	saved	the	government	nearly	1.3	billion	USD	each	year	on	its	
spending	on	wages,	pensions	and	social	welfare	(Radcliffe,	2017).	In	South	Africa,	according	to	CGAP	
(2011),	administrative	costs	of	delivering	social	transfers	for	the	South	African	Social	Security	Agency	
were	cut	by	54%	when	the	payments	were	rerouted	through	commercial	bank	accounts,	accessible	
through	 debit	 cards.	 The	 positive	 assessment	 of	 these	 experiences	 has	 encouraged	 more	
governments	 to	consider	 integrating	digital	 technologies	 in	 their	G2P	programmes.	Drawing	on	the	
outcomes	of	a	pilot	project,	for	instance,	Nepal’s	Ministry	of	Federal	Affairs	and	Local	Development	
(MoFALD)	 has	 estimated	 that	 the	 digitisation	 of	 the	 national	 SSA	 payment	 systems	 will	 cut	 the	
operational	costs	by	more	than	60%,	from	the	actual	NPR	1,332,085,514	million	(USD	12.483	million)	
to	NPR	475.09	million	(USD	4.467	million)	(UNCDF,	2016).		
	
Proponents	 of	 digital	 payments	 point	 at	 benefits	 for	 the	 citizens	 in	 terms	 of	 government	
accountability	 and	 lower	 transaction	 costs,	 both	 physical	 (cost	 of	movement),	 financial	 (what	 they	
have	 to	 pay	 for	 this)	 and	 economic	 (such	 as	 the	 opportunity	 costs	 of	 time	 use).	 Government’s	
accountability	is	a	pressing	issue	in	contexts	in	which	corruption	is	perceived	as	widespread.	The	fund	
diversion	that	often	marres	manual	G2P	programmes	risks	exacerbating	citizens’	distrust	towards	the	
government	and	undermines	political	participation.	By	producing	a	digital	record	which	can	be	later	
used	 for	 reconciliation,	 electronic	disbursements	 are	 seen	 in	 the	 literature	 as	 a	way	 to	 reduce	 the	
request	of	kickbacks	by	officials	 in	exchange	 for	 the	 release	 the	payment	 (Gelb	and	Decker,	2011).	
For	instance,	Muralidharan	et	al.	(2014)	argue	that,	in	India,	shifting	from	a	manual	delivery	of	social	
security	allowances	to	a	digital	one,	using	smart	cards,	has	cut	the	incidence	of	bribe	demands	from	
government	 officials	 by	 almost	 50%,	 from	 3.8%	 for	 manual	 cash	 payments	 to	 1.8%	 for	 digital	
payments.	In	Argentina,	the	introduction	of	an	electronic	benefits	card	for	all	the	beneficiaries	of	the	
Jefe	welfare	 programme	 has	 reduced	 the	 rate	 of	 participants	 admitting	 to	 paying	 a	 bribe	 to	 local	
officials	from	3.6	percent	to	0.3	percent	(Pickens	et	al.	2009;	Smith	et	al.	2015).		
	
The	assessment	of	digital	cash	transfer	projects	in	Niger	and	Haiti,	two	countries	that	present	several	
challenges	at	infrastructural	and	security	level,	has	highlighted	further	advantages	for	the	recipients	
of	 the	 payments	 in	 terms	 of	 lower	 travel	 expenses	 and	 increased	 security	 (Aker	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 BFA,	
2013).	Following	the	implementation	of	a	cash	transfer	programme	in	Niger,	for	instance,	Aker	et	al.	
(2015)	observed	 that	 the	delivery	via	mobile	phone	 reduced	 travel	and	waiting	 time	by	75%	when	
compared	to	manual	delivery.	Beneficiaries,	mostly	women,	saved	40	minutes	for	the	overall	travel.	
The	study	suggested	that	the	economic	value	of	the	saved	time	could	be	devoted	to	other	productive	
activities	 and	 was	 enough	 to	 feed	 a	 family	 of	 five	 for	 a	 day	 (ibid.).	 These	 conclusions	 can	 be	
generalised	 to	 rural	 settings	 where	 infrastructures	 are	 poor	 or	 absent	 and	 travelling	 to	 delivery	
points,	often	located	in	regional	capitals,	is	a	costly	and	time-consuming	endeavour	for	recipients	of	
cash	 payments.	 Receiving	 the	 payment	 directly	 on	 a	 mobile	 handset,	 and	 cashing	 out	 through	
authorised	merchants	 or	 roving	 agents,	would	 save	 the	beneficiary	 resources	 that	 can	be	directed	
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towards	 consumption	 or	 income	 generating	 activities.	 Moreover,	 travelling	 to	 remote	 or	 crime-
ridden	 areas	 is	most	 of	 the	 time	 a	 source	 of	 concern	 for	 the	most	 vulnerable	 individuals,	 such	 as	
women,	who	 are	 often	 the	 designated	 recipients	 of	 cash	 transfers,	 particularly	 so	 once	 they	 have	
picked	the	cash	and	carried	it	back	home.	The	case	of	regular	cash	payments,	in	which	the	dates	and	
locations	of	the	distribution	are	fixed,	presents	further	risks.	Digital	accounts	and	mobile	wallets	offer	
greater	 security	 by	 reducing	 the	 need	 to	 carry	 cash.	 An	 assessment	 conducted	 in	 Haiti	 by	
MercyCorps,	an	INGO,	on	Ti	Manman	Cheri,	a	government-led	conditional	cash	transfer	programme	
transferring	cash	to	75,000	mothers	of	school	children	using	mobile	money	payments	through	MNO	
Digicel’s	 TchoTcho	 Mobile,	 found	 that	 security	 was	 one	 the	 main	 perceived	 benefits	 for	 the	
recipients,	along	with	convenience	and	trust	(Zimmerman	et	al.,	2014).	
	
Also,	 improving	 the	 delivery	 of	 cash	 transfer	 through	 electronic	 means	 is	 suggested	 to	 lead	 to	 a	
greater	 preparedness	 in	 case	 of	 humanitarian	 emergency.	 Several	 studies	 have	 pointed	 at	 the	 key	
role	of	digital	social	protection	programmes	in	building	up	the	capabilities	to	cope	with	unexpected	
events	 such	 as	 natural	 disasters	 and	 other	 types	 of	 humanitarian	 emergencies.	 A	 report	 by	 the	
International	Rescue	Committee	 (IRC)	 (2016)	argues	 that	 there	 is	a	 strong	correlation	between	 the	
efficiency	of	emergency	cash	transfers	and	levels	of	preparedness9.		
	
2.3	 Linking	cash	transfers	to	financial	inclusion	
	
Besides	 the	 immediate	 advantages	 of	 digital	 G2P	 for	 smoothing	 consumption	 and	 increasing	
resilience	 to	 shocks,	 digital	 payment	 proponents	 suggest	 that	 cash	 transfers	 have	 the	 potential	 to	
advance	a	financial	 inclusion	agenda	(Smith	et	al.,	2015).	Demirguc-Kunt	et	al.	 (2015)	estimate	that	
“shifting	 the	 payment	 of	 government	 wages	 and	 transfers	 from	 cash	 into	 accounts	 could	 cut	 the	
number	of	unbanked	adults	by	160	million—or	8	percent.”	G2P,	and,	more	broadly,	bulk	payments,	
are	 seen	 as	 an	 “on-ramp”	 to	 financial	 inclusion	 (Klapper	 and	 Singer,	 2014;	 Owens,	 2013)	 because	
they	 rest	 on	 a	 technological	 infrastructure	 and	 arrangements	 that	 enable	 beneficiaries	 to	 gain	
familiarity	 with	 DFS.	 Pickens	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 argue	 that,	 by	 requiring	 a	 ‘landing	 spot’	 to	 deposit	 and	
administer	 funds	 for	 the	 beneficiaries,	 digital	 cash	 transfer	 programmes	 may	 facilitate	 financial	
inclusion	by	allowing	a	safer	and	more	accessible	storage	of	 funds	and	 increasing	 the	 transactional	
capability	of	the	users.	The	landing	spot	of	the	social	payments,	whether	a	bank	account	or	a	mobile	
wallet,	set	up	with	the	support	of	the	state	to	receive	payments,	is	seen	by	FSPs	as	an	opportunity	to	
build	a	relationship	with	the	recipients	and	 inform	and	 introduce	them	to	a	wide	range	of	 financial	
services,	 such	 as	 savings	 accounts,	 utility	 bill	 payments,	 international	money	 transfers,	 credits	 and	
insurance	 (ibid.).	 Delivering	 payments	 directly	 into	 mobile	 wallets	 or	 bank	 accounts	 helps	 build	
familiarity	with	digital	means	of	payment,	thus	paving	the	way	to	the	adoption	of	more	sophisticated	
products.	In	Brazil,	for	instance,	15%	of	14	million	families	from	the	Bolsa	Familia	social	cash	transfers	
programme	 receive	 payments	 on	 a	 no-frills	 account	 set	 up	 with	 one	 of	 the	 contractors	 of	 the	
government	 Caixa	 bank.	 As	 reported	 by	 Bold	 et	 al.	 (2012),	 40%	 of	 Bolsa	 Família	 recipients	 have	
started	using	at	 least	one	other	product	of	the	bank.	CGAP	(2009)	argues	that	digital	cash	transfers	
“create	the	basis	 to	deliver	 financial	services	 to	recipients	via	branchless	banking	channels,	such	as	
debit	cards	and	mobile	phones.”		
	
While	the	assessments	of	cash	transfer	programmes	that	have	shifted	from	manual	to	digital	delivery	
appear	 to	 corroborate	 the	 expectations	 of	 greater	 efficiency,	 efficacy	 and	 transparency	 for	 state	
agencies	 and	 improved	 security	 for	 the	 recipients,	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	
digitisation	 of	 social	 protection	 and	 financial	 inclusion	 provides	 contradicting	 examples.	 As	 most	
programmes	 have	 been	 ongoing	 for	 not	 long	 or	 are	 currently	 in	 a	 pilot	 stage,	 the	 evidence	 is	 still	
																																								 																				
9	IRC	uses	a	preparedness	framework	to	assess	the	preconditions	necessary	for	making	a	county’s	e-payment	
ecosystem	ready	to	support	cash	transfers	at	scale	in	emergency	response.	
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limited	 and	 inconclusive.	 For	 instance,	 while	 the	 evaluation	 of	 a	 G2P	 program	 in	 Peru	 found	 no	
correlation	between	digital	payments	and	saving	behaviour,	in	Mexico	the	assessment	of	a	G2P	Cash	
Transfer	programme	established	a	 link	between	 improvement	 in	 savings	and	access	 to	ATMs	cards	
(Barry,	 2018).	 In	 Pakistan,	 the	 evaluation	 of	 BISP	 programme	 found	 that,	 although	 G2P	 payments	
smooth	 the	 consumption	of	 the	 recipients,	 increase	 their	 collateral	 to	 obtain	 informal	 store	 credit	
from	 local	 shopkeepers	 and	 provide	 them	 with	 seed	 capital	 for	 small	 investments,	 there	 is	 little	
evidence	of	 increased	formal	financial	 inclusion	and	regular	usage	of	banking	services	(even	though	
digital	payments	are	routed	through	a	bank	account)	(ibid.).	A	recent	CFI	study	challenges	the	belief	
in	 a	 linear	 relationship	 between	 digital	 social	 protection	 programmes	 and	 financial	 inclusion,	
suggesting	that,	“currently,	there	is	little	indication	that	G2P	payments	do	result	in	increased	financial	
inclusion	 through	any	 sort	of	direct	mechanism	 related	 to	 the	delivery	of	 those	payments	 through	
formal	financial	service	providers”	(Stuart,	2015).		
	
Analysing	 the	data	of	 the	WB	Global	 Findex	Database	2014,	 the	World	Bank	Group	Committee	on	
Payments	and	Market	 Infrastructures	(2015)	 found	that	a	 linear	relationship	between	cash	transfer	
and	greater	access	to	transaction	accounts	can	be	applied	only	to	some	countries	with	account-based	
cash	 transfers,	 namely	 Argentina,	 Botswana,	 Brazil,	 Kazakhstan	 and	 Ukraine.	 In	 other	 countries,	
namely	Belarus,	Botswana,	Malaysia	and	Mongolia,	at	least	50%	of	the	recipients	withdraw	the	funds	
only	 gradually,	 when	 they	 are	 needed.	 A	World	 Bank	 report	 (2015)	 suggests	 that	 individuals	 who	
opened	their	first	account	to	receive	a	payment	are	more	likely	to	be	conducting	transactions	with	a	
formal	financial	institution	than	individuals	who	had	no	account	and	received	their	payment	in	cash	
(World	Bank,	2015).	Moreover,	being	among	the	beneficiaries	of	cash	transfers	might,	in	some	case,	
help	 be	 better	 positioned	 to	 get	 loans	 from	 banking	 or	 microfinance	 institutions	 as	 it	 provides	 a	
collateral	(Priyadarshee	et	al.	2010).	However,	the	registration	of	either	a	bank	account	or	a	mobile	
wallet	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 ensure	 per	 se	 greater	 access	 to	 financial	 services,	 such	 as	 loans	 or	
mortgages,	for	which	collaterals	are	required	in	most	cases.		
	
2.4	 Limited	evidence	
	
So	 far,	 the	 likelihood	 that	owning	an	account	might	 induce	behavioural	 changes	 leading	 to	 regular	
savings,	 greater	expenditure	 in	health,	 education	and	 investment	 in	 income-generating	activities	 is	
based	on	hypothesis.	But	the	hype	surrounding	the	momentous	diffusion	of	mobile	phones	and	the	
popularity	of	mobile	money	in	some	emerging	economies	has	seeped	into	the	discussion.	Although	
acknowledging	 that	 technological	 innovations	 are	widening	 the	 repertoire	of	 options	 and	methods	
available	to	policymakers	to	reach	the	target	population,	Bastagli	et	al.	(2016)	observe	that	“the	use	
of	mobile	payment	technologies	may	reduce	opportunities	for	physical	interaction	with	beneficiaries,	
reducing	the	opportunities	for	delivery	of	complementary	interventions,	messaging	and	monitoring.”	
The	 crucial	 role	 of	 social	 networks	 to	 cope	with	 financial	 needs	 (Bold	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Kusimba	 et	 al.,	
2016;	 Johnson,	2014;	 Iazzolino	and	Wasike,	2015)	combines	with	 the	deep-rooted	distrust	 towards	
formal	financial	institutions	and	the	reliance	on	cash	as	a	means	of	payment	that	enable	to	diversify	
storages	of	value.	This	helps	explain	why,	very	often,	the	accounts	attached	to	landing	spots	for	the	
payments	 remain	 inactive	 (Stuart,	 2015;	 Bachas	 et	 al,	 2014)	 or	 have	 a	 ‘dump	 and	 pull’	 use.	
Beneficiaries	tend	to	withdraw	the	whole	amount	as	soon	as	the	payments	reach	their	account,	even	
when	 the	 programme	 allows	 them	 to	 save,	 because	 most	 beneficiaries	 do	 not	 perceive	 any	
advantage	to	secure	other	services	from	the	FSP	which	funnel	their	payment	(Almazan	2013).		
	
The	 beneficial	 implications	 of	 digital	 cash	 transfer	 on	 the	 financial	 inclusion	 of	 a	 favourite	 target	
population	of	social	protection	programmes,	poor	women	in	rural	areas,	are	also	debated.	 In	 India,	
for	instance,	where	most	cash	transfer	programmes	are	designed	for	women,	a	study	by	the	Centre	
for	Equity	Studies	analysed	the	reasons	behind	the	failure	of	a	conditional	maternity	benefit	scheme	
named	 Indira	 Gandhi	 Matritva	 Sahyog	 Yojana	 (IGMSY),	 in	 which	 cash	 was	 directly	 transferred	 to	
accounts	of	beneficiaries	(pregnant	and	lactating	mothers).	The	study	found	that	the	banks	in	charge	
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of	 the	 payments	 applied	 to	 women	 different	 requirements	 than	 to	 men,	 such	 as	 denying	 zero	
balance	and	keeping	 instead	a	minimum	deposit	 (Falcao	et	al.,	2015).	This	discrimination	reflects	a	
broader	 gender	 gap	 in	 financial	 inclusion	 (World	 Bank,	 2016).	Widespread	 lack	 of	 identity	 papers	
among	 women	 is	 considered	 by	 the	 report	 a	 major	 barrier	 to	 access	 entitlements	 via	 banks.	
Situations	of	gatekeeping	 in	which	women	beneficiaries	have	 to	depend	on	 local	 leaders	and	male	
relatives	 to	 withdraw	 their	 grants	 are	 not	 uncommon	 (Stuart,	 2017).	 Other	 barriers	 derive	 from	
cultural	and	religious	factors:	in	many	societies,	women	are	strongly	reluctant	to	interact	with	male	
banking	 agents,	 also	 to	 deepen	 their	 knowledge	 of	 financial	 services	 (Scharwatt	 and	Menischetti,	
2014).		
	
Moreover,	 the	academic	 literature	on	mobile	money	stresses	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 innovation	has	only	
partially	allowed	overcoming	some	limitations	derived	from	poor	infrastructure	(Etzo	and	Collander,	
2010).	This	appears	particularly	true	in	the	case	of	the	G2P	programmes,	whose	performance	mostly	
depends	 on	 state-provided	 infrastructures	 like	 electricity,	 transportation,	 and	 roads.	 An	 efficient	
infrastructure	 is	 therefore	 seen	 as	 a	 crucial	 element	 to	 “expand	 into	 the	 frontier”	 (Kimenyi	 and	
Ndung’u,	2009),	a	concept	encompassing	rural	population,	women,	and,	more	broadly,	all	swathes	of	
the	 population	 with	 low	 levels	 of	 DFS	 readiness10.	 The	 presence,	 the	 functioning	 and	 the	
maintenance	of	infrastructure	in	rural	areas,	where	most	G2P	payment	beneficiaries	are	located,	is,	
therefore,	a	crucial	aspect	to	account	for	in	management	of	systems	both	to	perform	the	payments	
and	verify	 the	 identity	of	 the	beneficiaries	 (Gilman	and	Shulist,	 2015).	Despite	 the	assumptions	on	
the	greater	reliability	of	digital	means	of	payment	than	manual	disbursement,	the	evidence	suggests	
that	 the	 capacity	 to	 respond	 to	 shocks	 of	 different	 nature	 varies	 according	 to	 the	 context.	 For	
instance,	 after	 Typhoon	 Haiyan	 ravaged	 the	 Philippines,	 the	 e-payment	 infrastructure	 was	 so	
damaged	that	the	government	had	to	resort	to	manual	cash	transfers	to	the	recipients	 in	the	most	
affected	areas	(O’Brien	et	al.,	2018).	
	
3 Operational	issues	
3.1	 Infrastructures	of	payment	
	
The	choice	of	 the	delivery	 channel	 through	which	G2P	payments	are	 funnelled	mostly	depends	on	
initial	 infrastructure	 installation	 and	 recurrent	 operating	 costs,	 along	 with	 contextual	 specificities	
such	 as	 population	 density	 and	 payment	 recipients‘	 concentration.11	 The	 administration	 and	
																																								 																				
10	Readiness	is	considered	a	critical	factor	for	DFS	uptake	(Leach	and	Mensah,	2016).	The	concept	refers	to	the	
preconditions	necessary	to	progress	on	the	customer	journey	for	a	specific	type	of	financial	account.	Different	
preconditions	 are	 required	 to	 start	 the	 customer	 journey	 for	 different	 types	 of	 financial	 accounts.	 DFS	
readiness	encompasses	six	components	that	may	facilitate	or	hinder	the	customer	journey:	having	a	national	ID	
to	 comply	 with	 KYC	 requirements,	 numeracy,	 literacy,	 mobile	 phone	 ownership,	 SMS	 texting	 abilities	 and	
education.	These	components	of	readiness	correlate	with	DFS	ownership	and	usage.	
11	A	toolkit	developed	by	ISPA	(2015)	identifies	the	following	types	of	electronic	channels:	
• E-vouchers:	 unique	 serialised	 vouchers	 recorded	 in	 a	 database	 which	 can	 be	 redeemed	
electronically	in	exchange	for	cash	or	goods	by	merchants,	often	using	a	mobile	phone	to	process	the	
transactions	 and	 verify	 their	 validity	 of	 the	 vouchers.	 Typically	 used	 for	 one-off	 or	 short-term	
payments,	and	traded	in	exchange	for	goods	such	as	agricultural	inputs,	fertiliser,	and	grain;	
• Payment	 cards:	 different	 types	 of	 payment	 cards,	 divided	 into:	 prepaid	 cards;	 reloadable;	
Magnetic	stripe	debit	cards	(to	withdraw	cash	at	an	ATM	and	to	pay	for	goods	and	services	at	retail	
outlets	 using	 a	 POS	 device);	 Smart	 cards	 (powered	 by	 a	microprocessor	 or	memory	 chip,	 possibly	
personalized	with	the	holder’s	biometric	information	such	as	a	fingerprint	or	photo);	
• Mobile	money:	e-money	stored	 in	a	digital	wallet.	 Following	 the	success	of	Safaricom’s	M-
Pesa11	 in	 Kenya,	 mobile	 money	 payments	 have	 catalysed	 the	 interest	 of	 government	 bodies	 and	
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distribution	of	cash	transfers	require	the	construction	of	an	infrastructure	to	establish	a	unique	link	
between	a	customer	and	an	account;	to	keep	track	of	transactions	towards	or	out	of	an	account;	and	
to	collect	and	transfer	transactions	details	to	an	authorizing	entity.	These	‘payment	rails’	(Mas,	2015)	
enable	to	digitise	and	transfer	value	and	include	a	wide	array	of	capabilities,	spanning	from	“sending	
money	home,	paying	for	a	good	or	a	bill,	pushing	money	into	my	or	someone	else’s	savings	account,	
funding	a	withdrawal	at	an	agent,	or	repaying	a	loan”	(ibid.).	Digital	technologies	play	a	critical	role	in	
increasing	 the	 speed	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 to	 provide	 payment	 and	 reconcile	 payees’	 details,	
improving	identity	verification	solutions	and	accounting	techniques	(Vonthron	and	Almazan,	2014).		
A	key	constraint	to	the	use	of	digital	eco-systems	is	the	limited	diffusion	of	identity	documents,	such	
as	national	ID	and	voter	ID	card.	Recent	years,	however,	have	seen	the	significant	diffusion	of	digital	
biometric	 systems,	 or	 advanced	 human	 recognition	 (AHR).	 Between	 2005	 and	 2010,	 the	 biometric	
market	 has	 grown	 by	 34	 percent	 per	 year	 in	 developing	 countries,	mostly	 for	 creating	 beneficiary	
registries	 and	 authenticating	 cash	 or	 in-kind	 transfers	 (Gelb	 and	 Clark,	 2013).	 The	 integration	 of	
biometric	 systems	 of	 identification	 into	 cash	 transfer	 programmes	 is	 largely	 seen	 by	 policymakers	
and	practitioners	as	a	solution	to	the	problem	of	duplicates	and	ghost	beneficiaries,	a	major	drain	of	
resources	 in	 cash	 transfers	 using	manual	 delivery	 of	 payments	 due	 to	 the	 difficulties	 to	 verify	 the	
identity	of	the	legitimate	recipients	of	the	social	grants.		
	
Most	 systems	 are	 based	 on	 fingerprints	 or	 iris	 recognition	 and	 have	 been	 used	 sometimes	 in	
conjunction	with	smart	cards	to	authenticate	recipients	at	the	point	of	service.	For	instance,	in	India,	
the	government	launched	in	2013	the	Direct	Benefit	Transfer	(DBT)	programme	to	replace	traditional	
cash	transfer	schemes	based	on	the	manual	distribution	of	money	and	transfer	government	benefits	
directly	 into	 recipients’	bank	accounts	 in	43	of	 its	686	districts.	The	goal	of	 the	programme	was	 to	
minimise	 delays	 in	 the	 payments	 and	 better	 target	 the	 beneficiaries	 while	 reducing	 the	 risk	 of	
duplication	 and	 leakages	 (Bhatia	 and	 Baba,	 2017).	 To	 tackle	 the	 widespread	 lack	 of	 identification	
documents	 (only	 40	%	 of	 the	 Indian	 population	 has	 a	 birth	 certificate	 (UNICEF,	 2013)),	 DBT	 builds	
upon	the	so-called	JAM	trinity,	an	 initiative	that	 includes	the	financial	 inclusion	campaign	Jan-Dhan	
Yojana,	the	world’s	largest	biometric	ID	system	Unique	Identification	UID/Aadhar,	and	mobile	phone	
numbers.	A	platform	 links	 the	bank	accounts	of	 the	beneficiaries,	 their	unique	12-digit	 ID	numbers	
(distributed	to	1	billion	Indians	as	of	April	2016)	and	their	mobile	phone	numbers	and	allows	to	apply	
DBT	 to	all	 government	programmes	 (536	 schemes	across	65	ministries	and	departments)	 involving	
cash	transfers	to	individual	beneficiaries12.		
	
Also,	in	Pakistan,	the	Watan	smartcard	programme	was	built	upon	the	existing	infrastructure	of	the	
National	Database	and	Registration	Authority	(NADRA)	to	successfully	provide	reconstruction	grants	
to	 1,5	million	 families	 severely	 affected	 by	 flooding	 (Hunt	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Also,	 the	 country’s	 largest	
programme,	 BISP	 (see	 Box	 2),	 was	 built	 upon	 the	 National	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Registry	 but	 the	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																														
humanitarian	 agencies	 because	 of	 the	 capacity	 they	 offer	 to	 track	 payments,	 thus	 contributing	 to	
reducing	leakages.		
• No	physical	payment	instrument:	In	some	cases,	a	transaction	such	as	a	fund	withdrawal	can	
be	completed	by	entering	biometric	information	on	a	POS	device.	
12	 As	 of	 December	 2016,	 though,	 only	 84	 schemes	 were	 using	 DBT.	 Moreover,	 the	 preliminary	
assessments	of	the	programme	have	highlighted	a	number	of	obstacles	impinging	on	the	attainment	
of	the	financial	inclusion	goal,	such	as:	
• Lack	of	adequate	banking	infrastructure,	as,	in	India,	there	are	10.5	bank	branches	for	every	
100,000	adults;	
• The	slow	process	of	linking	Aadhaar	numbers	to	bank	accounts:	although	around	75%	of	the	
Indian	 population	 has	 been	 enrolled,	 only	 48%	 of	 bank	 accounts	 opened	 through	 the	
government’s	financial	inclusion	program	are	linked	to	Aadhaar.	
• Poor	Network	Connectivity:	the	diffusion	of	mobile	phone	and	network	coverage	is	still	
patchy	across	the	country).	
• Lack	of	Grievance	Redressal	Mechanism	(Sharma	and	Nair,	2016).	
	 13	
system	is	currently	being	overhauled	 in	order	to	rely	uniquely	on	biometrics	 (thus	doing	away	with	
smart	 cards)	 to	 verify	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 beneficiaries.	 This	 change	 is	 expected	 to	 address	 issues	
commonly	 faced	 by	women,	 such	 as	 having	 a	male	 relative	 picking	 up	 the	 grant	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	
recipient	 or	 handing	 over	 the	 card	 and	 PIN	 to	 the	 agent	 to	 perform	 the	 operation,	 as	 it	 requires	
agents	 to	 register	 the	 thumbprint	 of	 the	 recipient	 in	 a	 centralized	 database	 and	 disburse	 each	
payment	upon	biometric	identification.	The	underlying	expectation	driving	this	innovation	is	that	the	
biometrics	shift	will	facilitate	the	customer	journey	towards	more	advanced	DFS	(Stuart,	2015).		
	
In	 some	 cases,	 the	 implementers	 of	 biometric	 technology	 have	 modified	 their	 approach	 after	
encountering	 unexpected	 operational	 issues.	 In	 South	 Africa,	 for	 instance,	 social	 grants	 were	
originally	 disbursed	 through	 an	 off-line	 card-based	 system	 and	 mobile	 biometric	 ATMs	 (Gelb	 and	
Clark,	2013).	Later,	though,	the	FSPs	in	charge	of	the	operations	deemed	excessive	the	overhead	cost	
of	 providing	 payment	 points,	 including	 through	 dedicated	mobile	 ATMs.	 The	 payments	 were	 thus	
routed	 through	 bank	 accounts,	 allowing	 for	 greater	 savings	 on	 the	 operational	 costs.	 In	 the	
Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	 (DRC),	a	programme	of	demobilisation	grants	 to	ex-guerrilla	 fighters	
shifted	 from	 an	 approach	 based	 on	 pay	 points	 to	 another	 using	 mobile	 ATM	 because	 partner	
merchants	 in	charge	of	disbursing	the	payments	were	constantly	short	of	cash	(ibid.).	 In	a	few	G2P	
programmes,	 biometrics	 technologies	 are	 also	 used	 to	 verify	 conditionality,	 such	 as	 school	
attendance	and	health	clinic	visits.	In	Mexico,	the	Mexican	National	Commission	of	Social	Protection	
in	Health	(CNPSS)	plans	to	link	a	new	biometric	database	called	Sistema	Nominal	en	Salud	(SINOS)	in	
which	 are	 enrolled	 all	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 Seguro	 Popular	 (the	 national	 health	 plan)	 and	 of	 the	
national	 cash	 transfer	 programme	Oportunidades	 to	 verify,	 via	 fingerprints,	 that	 beneficiaries	 are	
complying	with	health	care	requirements	(ibid.).		
	
However,	 despite	 the	 declared	 aim	 of	 harnessing	 the	 potential	 of	 biometrics	 to	 extend	 social	
protection	and	render	‘legible’	to	the	state	segments	of	the	population	previously	invisible,	in	some	
case	 this	 goal	 has	proved	 to	be	 controversial.	 The	 above	mentioned	biometric	Aadhar	programme	
has	been	 the	 target	of	 over	 30	 challenges	 in	 the	 Indian	 Supre	Court	 by	 activists	mostly	 concerned	
with	 privacy	 violation	 and	denial	 of	 rights	 (Bhuyan,	 2018).	 The	deployment	 of	 the	programme	has	
been	marred	so	far	by	several	reports	of	breaches	 into	the	database	and	theft	of	biometric	data	of	
over	one	billion	people	(Safi,	2018).	Besides	putting	privacy	at	risk,	activists	also	fear	that	the	system	
might	 entrench	 the	 identity	 of	 members	 of	 lower	 castes.	 For	 instance,	 Bezwada	Wilson,	 national	
president	 of	 the	 Safai	 Karmachari	 Andolan,	 the	 organisation	 representing	 safai	 karmacharis,	 or	
manual	 scavengers,	 and	 a	 petitioner	 in	 a	 Supreme	 Court	 case	 against	 Aadhar,	 argues	 that,	 since	
[Aadhaar	 facilitates]	keeping	 identity	 forever	“in	your	Aadhaar,	my	occupation,	where	 I	come	from,	
everything	 will	 be	 there.	 Once	 you	 get	 the	 data,	 you	 can	 segregate	 in	 any	 way	 by	 means	 of	
technology.	(Deshmane,	2017)	
	
3.2	 New	frameworks	for	PPP	
	
The	 routing	 of	 social	 grants	 to	 the	 bank	 or	 mobile	 money	 accounts	 of	 the	 recipients	 requires	
technical	 and	 organisational	 arrangements	 based	 on	 expertise	 and	 technical	 capabilities	 that	 state	
actors	 often	 lack.	 By	 ushering	 in	 new	 approaches	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 services,	
current	 experiences	 of	 digitisation	 highlight	 new	 reconfigurations	 of	 public-private	 partnerships	
(PPP),	 in	which	 the	private	 sector	 takes	 over	 functions	which	were	previously	 a	prerogative	of	 the	
state.	 According	 to	 the	 recommendation	 of	 a	 report	 by	 the	 World	 Bank,	 BTCA	 and	 the	 Bill	 and	
Melinda	Gates	Foundation,	“[p]ublic	and	private	sectors	can	converge	around	a	payment	platform,	
and	 enable	 innovation	 and	 competition	 in	 additional	 financial	 services”	 acting	 as	 a	 “catalyst	 of	
financial	inclusion	[that]	will	foster	adoption	of	basic	financial	services	at	a	large	scale.”	(Klapper	and	
Singer,	2014:	iv).		
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FSPs	play	a	critical	role	in	providing	the	capability	for	the	management	and	the	distribution	of	digital	
cash	transfers	and	relieving	civil	servants	from	performing	disbursement	operations.	Janis	and	Shah	
(2016)	point	out	that,	in	the	most	effective	and	efficient	G2P	digitisation	programmes,	such	as	Brazil’s	
Bolsa	Familia	and	South	African	Social	Security	Agency	(SASSA)	grants,	 the	state	has	 filled	technical	
and	 organisational	 gaps	 by	 resorting	 to	 existing	 payment	 providers	 and	 leveraging	 their	
infrastructure.	By	contrast,	when	governments	have	sought	 to	deliver	 the	payments	by	 itself,	costs	
have	 increased.	 This	 was	 the	 case	 for	 Colombia’s	 CCT	 programme	Mas	 Familias	 en	 Acción	 (ibid.).	
Initially	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 cash,	 the	 Colombian	 government	 in	 2009	 opened	 saving	
accounts	for	the	programme	beneficiaries	at	a	government	bank.	However,	the	bank	proved	unable	
to	cope	with	the	demand	for	cash,	due	to	 its	 limited	agent	distribution	network,	and	was	forced	to	
rely	 on	 a	 third	 party.	 The	 costs	 skyrocketed	 and,	 according	 to	 a	 2012	 CGAP	 study,	 11.3%	 of	 the	
programme	 budget	was	 swallowed	 by	 administrative	 costs.	 In	 comparison,	 similar	 programmes	 in	
Brasil	and	South	Africa,	which	used	private	service	providers,	saw	between	1.2%	and	2.4%	used	for	
delivering	 the	 payments.	 Later,	 in	 2012,	 the	 Colombian	 government	 started	 also	 using	 Banco	
Davivienda’s	 mobile	 money	 platform	 DaviPlata	 to	 pay	 900,000	 beneficiaries	 of	 Mas	 Familias	 en	
Acción	directly	into	their	mobile	wallets	(ibid.).		
	
The	 private	 sector	 has	 typically	 shied	 away	 from	 initiatives	 that	might	 prove	 costly	 before	 turning	
profitable.	 Private	 operators	 are	 expected	 to	 benefit	 from	 the	 provision	 of	 G2P	 payments	 in	 the	
medium/long-term,	as	a	digital	payment	ecosystem	takes	shape13.	However,	they	have	to	face	setting	
up	costs	that	are	often	difficult	to	afford	(particularly	in	hard	to	reach	areas),	unless	they	are	offered	
incentives	from	governments,	ranging	from	a	favourable	fee	structure	to	tax	breaks	to	investments	in	
infrastructures.	 According	 to	 Porteous	 (2012),	 in	 the	 early	 stage,	 the	 payment	 of	 fees	 from	 the	
government	is	the	single	most	important	factor	to	make	the	business	financially	viable	for	the	service	
provider.		
	
These	expectations	translate	into	calls	to	policymakers	to	address	regulatory	issues	to	cut	red	tapes	
for	providers	and	enhance	citizens’	financial	capability,	and	work	with	the	private	sector	to	develop	
infrastructures	that	can	increase	access	in	rural	areas	–	thus	creating	an	enabling	environment.		
	
3.3	 Building	a	digital	payment	ecosystem	
	
A	recent	ITU	report	suggests	that	G2P	payments	are	a	tenet	of	a	digital	payment	ecosystem,	shaped	
by	 initiatives	 to	 enable	 and	 encourage	 merchants	 to	 accept	 digital	 payments	 (ITU,	 2016a).	 The	
ultimate	 goal	 of	 this	 ecosystem,	 such	 as	 envisaged	 by	 digital	 payment	 proponents,	 is	 to	 achieve	 a	
cashless	economy	in	which	cash	is	rendered	increasingly	redundant	because	electronic	payments	for	
goods	and	services	are	widely	accepted.	At	the	centre	of	the	discussion	on	digital	payment	ecosystem	
there	 is	 therefore	 the	 pursuit	 of	 strategies	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 cash-in/cash-out	 (CICO)	 to	
eventually	reach	a	state	of	so-called	“digital	liquidity”	(ibid.).	The	report	also	lists	three	main	business	
cases	that	FSPs	derive	from	their	participation	in	G2P	programmes:	first,	reaping	revenues	from	the	
fees	 charged	 to	 the	 government	 for	 the	 disbursement	 of	 the	 payments;	 second,	 selling	 different	
digital	 products;	 and	 third,	 acquiring	 detailed	 information	 on	 the	 financial	 behaviours	 and	
preferences	of	the	customers.	(ibid.)	
	
Once	members	of	poor	households	have	a	digital	account	where	the	payments	are	transferred,	the	
FSP	in	charge	of	the	operations	can	offer	to	upgrade	it	in	order	to	enable	a	broader	range	of	financial	
operations	 (Radcliffe	 and	 Voorhies,	 2012)	 and	 sell	 a	 number	 of	 products	 (such	 as	 contribution	
																																								 																				
13	The	GSMA	calculates	that,	in	the	early	stage	(1-2	years	operation),	the	revenue	that	an	MNO	obtain	from	DFS	
is	0.2%	of	the	total	MNO	revenue	while	the	direct	costs,	including	agent	commissions,	and	indirect	costs	are	
respectively	719%	and	107%	of	the	total	mobile	money	revenue.	However,	in	an	established	(over	5	years	old)	
ecosystem	the	revenue	rises	to	15%	while	the	direct	and	indirect	costs	fall	respectively	to	65%	and	20%.	
(Vonthron	and	Almazan,	2014)	
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pension	accounts,	insurance	products,	and	other	services)	to	support	the	beneficiaries’	commitment	
to	save	(Choi	et	al.,	2004;	Ashraf	et	al.,	2010;	Karlan	et	al.,	2012;	Karlan	et	al.,	2014).	This	upgrade	
would	be	considered	risky	in	economies	massively	reliant	on	informality	and	cash	transactions.	But	a	
digital	 payment	 ecosystem	 renders	 transactions	 traceable	 and	 financial	 behaviours	 legible	 and	
predictable	(BTCA,	2016).	
	
Digital	payment	proponents	often	portray	the	construction	of	a	digital	payment	ecosystems	as	a	win-
win	 situation	 for	 both	 the	 state	 and	 the	 private	 sector	 (Almazan	 and	 Vonthron,	 2014).	 The	
advantages	for	regulators	and	state	agencies	 lie	 in	the	potential	use	of	the	data	trails	generated	by	
digital	payments	to	police	previously	opaque	channels	and	enforce	financial	integrity;	accelerate	the	
formalisation	 of	 the	 economy;	 and	 improve	 tax	 collection,	 particularly	 in	 contexts	 in	 which	 the	
economy	 is	 mostly	 informal	 (Demirguc-Kunt	 et	 al.	 2015;	 de	 Koker	 and	 Jentz,	 2012).	 For	 FSPs,	
digitising	payments	is	expected	to	unlock	the	possibility	to	extract	economic	value	from	the	sizeable	
amount	of	personal	data	generated	by	 the	users	 and	 to	 improve	market	 segmentation	 in	order	 to	
predict	financial	needs	and	behaviours,	identify	risky	customers	and	design	tailored	products	(Aitken,	
2017).	 Recent	 advancements	 in	 data	 analytics	 have	 greatly	 improved	 the	 capacity	 to	 understand	
needs	and	behaviours	of	the	customers	in	order	to	develop	tailored	services.	Moreover,	by	using	the	
digital	trails	left	behind	by	transactional	data	and	by	a	number	of	indicators	captured	by	a	wide	range	
of	proxies	(such	as	contacts	in	social	networks	and	GPS	locations),	FSPs	are	expected	to	derive	credit	
scores	to	minimise	the	risk	derived	from	lending	to	individuals	with	a	negative	credit	history	(Aitken,	
2017;	Kear,	2018)14.		
	
This	points	at	a	 situation	 in	which	 the	unproblematic	 view	of	a	digital	payment	ecosystem	 that,	 at	
once,	works	for	the	poor	while	benefiting	the	private	sector	is	called	into	question.	FSPs	are	driven	by	
the	possibility	to	minimise	the	costs	(thanks	to	state’s	incentives	and	subsidies)	while	maximising	the	
profits	 (by	 leveraging	 their	 technological	 capability).	 But	 in	markets	 in	which	 personal	 data	 are	 an	
increasingly	profitable	resource,	policymakers	are	increasingly	faced	with	the	challenge	to	design	and	
implement	 the	 regulatory	 instruments	 to	 protect	 the	 payments’	 beneficiaries,	 and	 the	 citizens	 in	
general,	 from	opaque	business	practices.	As	an	emerging	 strand	of	 literature	on	big	data	 suggests,	
the	interest	of	the	private	sector	and	citizens	often	diverge,	particularly	when	the	business	models	of	
FSPs	 is	 based	 on	 accessing,	 extracting	 and	 storing	 personal	 data	 (Pasquale,	 2015;	 O’Neill,	 2016;	
Srnicek,	2016).		
	
The	challenge	for	regulators	presiding	over	the	implementation	of	digital	G2P	programme	is	thus	to	
harmonise	the	interests	of	FSPs	and	citizens.	
	
4	 Regulatory	Issues	
4.1	 Enabling	and	Safeguarding	
	
Most	policy	reports	on	the	digitisation	of	G2P	consulted	for	this	research	review	emphasise	the	need	
for	 governments	 and	 regulators	 (central	 banks	 and	 telecommunication	 authorities)	 to	 take	 a	
																																								 																				
14Faz	(2014)	argues	that	data	analytics	enables	financial	providers	to	develop	“second	generation”	DFS	building	
their	value	proposition	on	one	or	more	of	the	following	attributes:	Digital	Data	Trail,	generated	for	instance	by	
call	 records,	 airtime	 purchases	 and	 other	 transactional	 data	 which	 provide	 an	 indication	 of	 an	 individual’s	
income	 patterns,	 to	 apply	 for	 small	 and	 very	 short-term	 unsecured	 loans	 (for	 example	M-Shwari	 in	 Kenya);	
Real-time	 customer	 interactions,	 helping	 providers	 stay	 close	 to	 customers	 at	 all	 times,	 and	 deliver	 useful	
information	 at	 the	 moment	 it	 is	 needed;	 Smart	 and	 customized	 user	 interfaces	 helping	 customers	 better	
understand	 products	 and	 make	 smarter	 choices;	 Location	 intelligence,	 helping	 infer	 the	 context	 of	 an	
individual’s	 specific	 financial	 transaction,	which	 can	 improve	usability	 and	 reduce	 certain	 costs;	 Peer-to-peer	
connections	through	voice,	text,	and	apps,	which	can	strengthen	the	management	of	financial	networks,	since	
social	and	financial	networks	often	involve	the	same	individuals.	
		
16	
proactive	role	 in	shaping	an	ecosystem	featuring	 low	or	no	friction	for	digital	payments,	promoting	
innovation	and	balancing	financial	inclusion	and	integrity	(UNCDF,	2014;	di	Castri,	2013).	DFS	experts	
see	a	close	partnership	between	government	and	DFS	stakeholders	as	key	to	facilitate	the	digitization	
of	government	services	and	payments,	such	as	salaries	to	civil	servants	and	person-to-government	–	
P2G	–	transactions	(ITU,	2016a;	ADB,	2017).	
	
Besides	 the	 commitment	 to	 support	 the	 maintenance	 and	 expansion	 of	 the	 existing	 ICT	
infrastructure,	digital	payment	proponents	expect	governments	to	craft	a	policy	framework	aimed	at	
minimising	the	economic	barriers	that	make	large	value	"bulk"	payments	impractical;	compensating	
the	 service	 providers	 managing	 and	 operating	 the	 payment	 of	 social	 grants;	 and	 mitigating	 the	
charges	 to	 consumers	 for	 G2P	 payments	 (including	 cash-out	 fees).	 This	 strategy	 is	 buttressed	 by	
incentives	 to	 pay	 through	 digital	means	 and	 penalties	 to	 use	 cash	 (ITU,	 2016a).	 A	 case	 in	 point	 is	
Nigeria,	where	the	Central	Bank	(CBN)	in	2012	launched	“Cashless	Nigeria”,	a	two-pronged	approach	
which,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 established	 a	 daily	 limit	 on	 cash	 withdrawals	 and	 a	 service	 fee	 on	
withdrawals	in	excess	of	these	limits;	on	the	other,	committed	banks	to	scale	up	the	deployment	of	
point-of-service	(POS)	terminals	(Loeb,	2015).		
	
In	 a	 recently	 published	 paper,	 “Bulk	 Payments	 and	 the	 DFS	 Ecosystem”,	 ITU’s	 DFS	 Focus	 Group	
(2016b)	point	at	the	need	for	policies	behind	the	design	and	the	implementation	of	G2P	systems	to	
address	 simultaneously	 technical,	 logistical,	 and	 political	 challenges.	 The	 2016	 G20	 High	 Level	
Principles	 for	 Digital	 Financial	 Inclusion	 inspire	 the	 guidelines	 to	 balance	 incentives	 to	 innovation,	
safeguards	 for	 customers	 and	 the	 promotion	 of	 responsible	 practices.	 In	 fact,	 while	 a	 too	 strict	
regulation	might	stifle	competition	and	erode	the	profits	for	FSP,	thus	deterring	them	from	investing	
in	 innovation,	a	too	lax	regulation	might	undermine	the	safety	and	efficiency	of	payment	platforms	
and	 expose	 customers	 to	 risks	 derived	 from	 the	misuse	 of	 their	 data	 (Janis	 and	 Shah,	 2016).	 The	
policies	 hitherto	 designed	 and	 implemented	 to	 regulate	 digital	 G2P	 programmes	 can	 be	 roughly	
divided	into	two	broad	categories:		
	
• Enablers	 –	 to	 extend	 the	 reach	 of	 FSPs	 in	 hard	 to	 reach	 areas	 -	 in	 particular,	 branchless	
banking	-	and	promoting	innovation;		
• Safeguards	 –	 ensuring	 financial	 integrity	 through	 know-your-customer	 practices	 and	
protecting	customers.	
	
The	first	group	includes	policies	focusing	on	improving	branchless	banking;	the	second	group	focuses	
on	Know-Your-Customer	(KYC)	and	customer	protection	policies.	
	
4.2	 Facilitating	Branchless	Banking	
	
Branchless	banking	refers	to	“the	delivery	of	financial	services	outside	conventional	bank	branches,	
often	 using	 agents	 and	 relying	 on	 information	 and	 communications	 technologies	 to	 transmit	
transaction	details	 –	 typically	 card-reading	 POS	 terminals	 or	mobile	 phones”	 (CGAP,	 2010).	Widely	
considered	 as	 a	 key	 factor	 behind	 the	 successful	 implementation	 of	 G2P	 programmes,	 branchless	
banking	is	seen	by	FSPs	and	think	tanks	such	as	CGAP	as	a	transformation	gateway	for	the	unbanked	
(Bold,	 2011),	 facilitating	 access	 to	 customers	 considered	 unprofitable	 by	 formal	 brick-and-mortar	
banks	and	therefore	not	worth	investing	in	infrastructures	and	financial	awareness	campaigns.		
	
In	order	to	achieve	this	goal,	the	DFS	sector	envisage	a	regulatory	framework	that	allows	non-bank	
agents	 to	 perform	 financial	 operations	 and	 open	 accounts	 while	 upholding	 security	 standards	 in	
order	to	increase	the	number	of	service	points.	Also,	this	regulation	should	enable	a	diverse	range	of	
players	 to	 contribute	 to	 innovating	 the	 payment	 ecosystem	 by	 providing	 payment	 services	 and	
issuing	 e-money	 (ibid.).	 As	 shown	 by	 evidence	 from	 different	 countries,	 regulations	 allowing	
branchless	banking	 through	non-bank	agents	 thus	play	 a	 critical	 role	 in	determining	 the	 successful	
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implementation	of	digital	G2P	programmes	(Bold	et	al.,	2012).		
	
In	 Pakistan,	 for	 instance,	 the	 success	 of	 the	 country’s	 flagship	 social	 protection	 scheme,	 BISP,	 has	
built	 upon	 a	 branchless	 banking	 regulation,	 approved	 in	 2008,	 which	 allows	 mobile	 network	
operators	 to	 own	 financial	 institutions	 (CGAP,	 2013;	 Smith	 et	 al.	 2015).	 By	 acknowledging	 the	
possibility	 for	 a	 broad	 and	 diverse	 range	 of	 FSP	 (mobile	 network	 operators,	 banks,	 micro-finance	
institutions,	money	transfer	operators)	to	serve	as	channels	for	G2P	payments,	regulators	are	indeed	
adopting	a	flexible	approach	to	take	into	account	local	specificities.	In	a	similar	fashion,	Brasil’s	Bolsa	
Família	 cash	 transfer	 programme	 allows	 recipients	 to	 choose	 whether	 to	 receive	 the	 payment	
through	smart	cards,	direct	deposit	into	a	no-frills	bank	account,	or	even	in	cash	(CGAP,	2011).		
	
Encouraging	interoperability	among	different	platforms	and	prohibiting	agent	exclusivity	(so	that	an	
agent	 can	 offer	 products	 and	 services	 from	 different	 operators)	 are	 also	 seen	 as	 key	 steps	 in	
regulatory	 policies	 that	 facilitate	 branchless	 banking	 (Klapper	 and	 Singer,	 2014).	 Interoperability	 is	
based	 on	 a	 view	 of	 the	 system	 as	 an	 open	 loop	 which	 all	 qualified	 participants	 can	 join	 (Bill	 and	
Melinda	 Gates	 Foundation’s	 Level	 One	 Project,	 2016).	 It	 is	 seen	 by	 practitioners	 as	 a	 solution	 to	
simplify	the	task	of	routine	payments.	FSP	networks	might	be	unequally	distributed	on	the	territory	
and	 G2P	 recipients	 in	 areas	 not	 served	 by	 the	 government’s	 contractor	 would	 be	 penalised.	 An	
interoperable	digital	payment	market	would	allow	customers	of	different	MNOs,	or	even	bank	and	
MNO	customers,	to	transfer	mobile	money	to	each	other	at	no	additional	fee.	
	
The	prohibition	of	agent	exclusivity	allows	agents	who	are	not	employed	by	a	service	provider	to	sell	
products	from	other	operators.	While	this	provision	facilitates	the	transfer	of	value	to	customers	of	
different	 MNOs,	 it	 has	 been	 sometimes	 contentious.	 Operators,	 in	 particular,	 have	 expressed	
concerns	 that	 non-exclusivity	 might	 give	 too	 much	 negotiating	 power	 to	 agents	 (who	 could,	
therefore,	 put	 more	 efforts	 in	 marketing	 the	 services	 of	 the	 providers	 who	 offer	 the	 highest	
commissions)	 (Greenacre	 and	Buckley,	 2014).	 Considered	 as	 a	 tenet	 of	 branchless	 banking,	 agents	
are	critical	to	verify	the	identity	of	the	recipient,	disburse	the	money,	and	help	customers	get	familiar	
with	digital	products.	For	DFS	providers,	agent	outlets	are	“the	first	and	most	tangible	service	touch	
points	 for	most	 customers”	 (Mas	and	McCaffrey,	 2015),	 reaching	 segments	of	 the	population	with	
limited	access	to	financial	services	such	as	women	and	rural	residents.	 In	most	cases,	agent	outlets	
are	 linked	 to	 shops,	 from	 which	 they	 draw	 the	 cash	 necessary	 to	 pay	 the	 G2P	 beneficiaries	
(Bersudskaya	and	McCaffrey,	2017).	For	FSPs,	agent	networks	are	instrumental	to	increase	the	profits	
from	 basic	 operations,	 such	 as	 CICO,	 in	 which	 cash	 is	 converted	 in	 e-money,	 or	 vice-versa,	 to	
customer	registration,	to	the	sale	and	so-called	‘cross-selling’	of	products,	making	clients	aware	of	-	
and	persuading	them	to	try	–	other	products	beyond	mobile	money	(Kendall	et	al.,	2014).	For	FSPs,	
investing	 in	 the	 expansion	 of	 agent	 networks	 is	 a	 risky	 endeavour,	 as	 the	 high	 investments	 often	
required	to	fill	gaps	and	deficiencies	in	the	existing	service	infrastructure	fail	to	generate	profits	in	a	
reasonable	 time.	 The	 GSMA,	 for	 instance,	 estimates	 that	 the	 operational	 costs	 of	 agent	 networks	
range	between	40	-	80%	of	the	revenue	generated	from	the	business	(Almazan	and	Vonthron,	2014).	
Innovation,	 in	both	technology	and	business	models,	 is	considered	a	key	factor	in	shaping	a	market	
for	 advanced	 DFS,	 such	 as	 loans	 and	 insurance,	 that	 would	 yield	 greater	 profit	 margins.	 G2P	
programmes	 are	 therefore	 seen	 by	 FSP	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 leverage	 their	 agent	 networks	 to	
negotiate	 favourable	 fee	 schemes	 with	 the	 government,	 and	 thus	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 investing	 in	
geographical	areas	with	no	immediate	economic	return.		
	
4.3	 Financial	integrity	meets	financial	inclusion	
	
In	 an	 updated	 version	 of	 the	 2010	 High-Level	 Principles	 for	 Digital	 Financial	 Inclusion	 released	 in	
2016,	 the	 Global	 Partnership	 for	 Financial	 Inclusion	 (GPFI)	 singled	 out	 identity	 and	 consumer	
protection	as	the	most	pressing	issues	for	policymakers	to	address	in	order	to	harness	the	potential	
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of	digital	cash	 transfers	 for	 financial	 inclusion.	This	 two-pronged	strategy	 focuses,	on	one	hand,	on	
technological	 innovations;	 on	 the	 other,	 on	 the	 regulation	 to	 oversee	 the	 application	 of	 these	
technologies	and	the	use	of	the	data	extracted	through	them.	
	
At	 regulatory	 level,	 KYC	 policies	 respond	 to	 the	 need	 to	 meet	 financial	 integrity	 requirements,	
particularly	 to	 sanitise	 financial	 chanels	 from	 the	 risk	 of	money	 laundering	 and	 terrorist	 financing	
(Koker	 and	 Jentz,	 2013;	 Chatain	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 FATF,	 2011).	 However,	 the	 attempt	 to	 align	 the	
objectives	of	financial	 inclusion	and	financial	 integrity	is	challenging,	particularly	in	contexts	such	as	
rural	areas,	where	too	stringent	requirements	can	prevent	individuals	lacking	official	ID	from	opening	
a	 digital	 account	 and	 accessing	 their	 funds.	 ITU	 (2016)	 points	 out	 that	 the	 national	 ID	 systems,	 a	
cornerstone	 of	 KYC	 procedures	 to	 guarantee	 the	 transparency	 and	 the	 compliance	 of	 payment	
schemes	 to	 international	 standards,	 is	 “inherently	 political”.	 The	 example	 of	 India’s	 Aadhar,	
previously	described,	is	a	case	in	point.	In	most	countries	in	which	large	part	of	the	population	(and	
most	 beneficiaries	 of	 social	 protection	 programmes)	 perform	 low-value	 transactions,	 a	 risk	
proportionate	KYC	system	has	been	created	to	 loosen	identification	requirements	and	lower	access	
barriers	to	financial	services	(di	Castri,	2013).	In	Mexico,	for	instance,	the	Central	Bank	has	adopted	in	
2011	a	 tiered	KYC	approach	 incorporating	different	 levels	of	simplified	accounts,	each	with	 its	own	
requirements	 and	 limits,	 leading	 to	 the	opening	of	 9.1	million	 accounts	 in	 the	 following	 two	 years	
(Faz	 2013).	 In	 Colombia,	 low-value	 accounts	 can	 be	 opened	 in	 remote	 areas	 (Almazan,	 2013).	 The	
State	Bank	of	Pakistan	for	instance	has	reduced	the	KYC	requirements	for	low-balance	accounts,	thus	
facilitating	the	registration	and	account	openings	for	new	beneficiaries.	(CGAP,	2013)		
	
In	 recent	 years,	 innovations	 in	 identity	 verification,	 based	 on	 biometrics,	 encryption,	 distributed	
ledgers,	and	smart	devices	have	enabled	new	models	for	managing	identity.	Behind	the	development	
of	 these	 technologies	 there	 are	 often	 public-private	 partnerships,	 animated	 by	 the	 goal	 to	 offer	
countries	 lacking	a	national	 ID	system	the	possibility	of	 leapfrogging	 to	a	 fully	digital	 infrastructure	
(Caribou,	2016).	At	the	same	time,	the	involvement	of	the	private	sector	in	the	construction	and	the	
management	 of	 infrastructures	 underpinning	 the	 provision	 of	 public	 services	 (including	 social	
protection	 payments)	 raises	 new	 questions	 on	 the	 ownership	 and	 the	 use	 of	 citizens’	 data	 which	
should	be	addressed	by	consumer	protection	regulations.	
		
4.4	 Protecting	customers	
	
Consumer	 protection	 is	 regarded	 by	 a	 number	 of	 organisations,	 such	 as	 Better	 than	 Cash	 Alliance	
(BTCA)	and	GSMA,	as	a	critical	element	to	build	trust	in	the	service,	but	one	that	has	to	be	properly	
harmonised	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 financial	 inclusion	 agenda.	 As	 a	 policy	 principle,	 consumer	
protection	is	based,	according	to	the	World	Bank	(2012),	on	five	pillars:	transparency,	choice,	redress,	
privacy	and	trust.	CGAP	sees	consumer	protection	through	the	lens	of	‘customer	centricity’,	arguing	
that	 poor	 consumer	 protection	 measures,	 particularly	 in	 the	 cases	 of	 recourse	 mechanisms	 and	
fraud,	can	undermine	a	G2P	system	and	have	repercussions	on	consumers’	perception	of	DFS	(Mazer,	
2014).15		
	
A	recent	study	of	the	DFS	landscape	in	Indonesia	(Microsave,	2017)	argues	that	digital	payment	users	
are	particularly	 concerned	about	 lack	of	 clarity	on	DFS	 transaction	 charge,	 complaint	handling	 and	
grievance	 redressal	 mechanisms.	 In	 India,	 a	 country	 where	 the	 digitisation	 of	 social	 protection	
programmes	 is	at	 the	centre	of	a	national	debate	 (Srinivas,	2017;	CIS,	2016),	 the	discussion	on	 the	
																																								 																				
15	A	CGAP	Focus	Note	(2015)	examining	evidence	from	consumer	research	in	16	low-income	markets	identifies	
seven	 key	 consumer	 risk	 areas	 that	 a	protection	 framework	 should	address	 in	order	 to	 reinforce	 customers’	
trust	into	the	system	and	thus	prepare	the	groundwork	for	a	smooth	digital	transition	of	G2P	programmes:	
Inability	 to	 transact	due	 to	network/service	downtime;	 Insufficient	agent	 liquidity	or	 float,	which	also	affects	
ability	 to	 transact;	 User	 interfaces	 that	 many	 find	 complex	 and	 confusing;	 Poor	 customer	 recourse;	 Non-
transparent	fees	and	other	terms;	Fraud	that	targets	customers;	Inadequate	data	privacy	and	protection.	
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design	of	an	appropriate	Ombudsman	framework	points	at	a	growing	concern	over	the	datafication	
of	 financial	 services16.	 Indeed,	 the	 collection	 of	 digital	 data	 derived	 from	 the	 use	 of	 DFS	 raises	
questions	 on	 data	 privacy	 and	 protection	 which	 have	 so	 far	 been	 little	 addressed	 by	 existing	
regulations	 (Chen	and	Faz,	 2015).	 Evidence	 from	 the	 field	 suggests	 in	 fact	 that	 in	most	developing	
countries	 DFS	 users	 have	 limited	 awareness	 of	 their	 data	 trail,	 often	 ending	 up	 relinquishing	
confidential	 data	 to	 agents	 in	 order	 to	 access	 loans	 (Mazer	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Moreover,	 a	 regulatory	
framework	for	data	collection	and	usage	appears	particularly	necessary	against	a	backdrop	in	which	
the	private	sector	acts	as	an	essential	 interface	between	the	government	and	the	citizens,	handling	
highly	 sensitive	 data	 that	 might	 increase	 its	 leverage	 over	 the	 state.	 This	 raises	 a	 fresh	 set	 of	
questions	on	the	type	of	regulatory	frameworks	that	should	be	designed	to	hedge	against	the	risk	of	
socialising	the	risk	of	innovation	while	privatising	the	rewards	(Mazzucato,	2013).		
	
5	 Conclusions	and	suggestions	for	further	research	
	
Digital	G2P	payments	are	a	relatively	new	phenomenon	that	is	drawing	the	interest	of	policymakers,	
development	 practitioners	 and	 the	 private	 sector.	 Policymakers	 expect	 digital	 technologies	 to	
improve	 the	efficiency	and	 the	accountability	of	 cash	 transfers	while	 reducing	 the	 financial	burden	
for	 the	 state.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 and	 along	 with	 development	 practitioners,	 they	 see	 DFS	 as	 an	
accelerator	 of	 financial	 inclusion	 for	 citizens	 excluded	 from	 formal	 financial	 services.	 FSPs	 are	
attracted	 by	 the	 possibility	 to	 introduce	 customers	 to	 more	 advanced,	 and	 profitable,	 DFS	 and	
minimise	 the	 costs	 of	 investing	 in	 risky	 markets	 by	 leveraging	 the	 government’s	 help	 through	
subsidies,	tax	breaks	and	investments	in	infrastructures.		
	
This	phase	of	the	debate	is	mostly	speculative.	While	the	assessments	of	the	projects	rolled	out	so	far	
seem	to	corroborate	 the	expectations	of	greater	efficiency,	accountability	and	saving	 for	 the	state,	
there	seems	to	be	a	flimsy	link	between	the	digitisation	of	G2P	payments	and	the	advancement	of	a	
financial	inclusion	agenda.	Despite	the	proliferation	of	deployments	around	the	world	to	shift	from	a	
manual	 to	 an	 electronic	 delivery	 of	 social	 payments,	 the	 results	 have	 not	 yet	 matched	 the	
expectations	 of	 greater	 uptake	 of	 financial	 services.	 There	 is	 very	 limited	 evidence	 that	 having	 a	
“landing	spot”	to	receive	a	payment,	in	the	form	of	a	bank	account	or	a	mobile	wallet,	prompts	the	
beneficiary	to	use	their	accounts	to	perform	payments	or	store	their	savings.	More	often	than	not,	
“electronic	delivery	itself	does	not	advance	financial	inclusion,	but	it	does	create	the	basis	to	deliver	
financial	services	to	recipients	via	branchless	banking	channels”	(Pickens	et	al,	2009;	see	also	Samson	
et	al.,	2010).	However,	 in	some	cases,	a	correlation	was	observed	between	the	reception	of	digital	
payments	and	the	usage	of	formal	financial	services	was	observed.	
	
Digital	 payment	 proponents	 emphasise	 that	 a	 strategic	 PPP	 finalised	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 digital	
payment	 ecosystem	would	 enable	 the	 alignment	 of	 commercial	 and	 developmental	 goals.	 But	 the	
objectives	of	public	and	private	actors	might	start	to	diverge	in	the	future,	as	some	market	segments	
appear	more	eager	to	embrace	DFS	than	others,	thus	providing	incentives	to	FSPs	to	focus	on	some	
beneficiaries	 who	 are	 considered	 “bankable”	 while	 neglecting	 others	 who	 stick	 to	 cash	 and	 to	
informal	 financial	 institutions.	 This	 would	 reveal	 a	 rift	 in	 strategies	 to	 extend	 access	 to	 formal	
financial	services	to	the	poor	and	the	inherent	contradictions	of	 inclusion	as	intended	by	the	public	
and	 the	 private	 sector.	 These	 contradictions	 are	 likely	 to	 become	 evident	 in	 the	 operational	 and	
regulatory	 issues	examined	 in	the	paper.	The	discussion	around	these	aspects	bring	to	the	fore,	on	
the	one	hand,	 the	policymakers’	attempts	to	reconcile	the	 inclusive	goal	pursued	by	the	state	with	
the	 private	 sector’s	 need	 for	 a	 business	 case;	 on	 the	 other,	 the	 importance	 of	 contextual	
																																								 																				
16	Mayer-Schönberger	and	Cukier	(2013)	differentiate	between	digitisation	and	datafication:	the	former	refers	
to	the	adoption	of	a	digital	system	to	store	and	process	information;	the	latter	refers	to	the	potentialities	for	
predictive	analytics	and	value	generation	unlocked	by	the	coupling	of	digitisation	and	enhanced	computational	
capacity.		
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characteristics	 in	shaping	the	trajectory,	and	affect	the	outcome,	of	G2P	programmes.	The	relevant	
academic	literature	is	still	inconclusive,	but	the	current	situation	could	help	provide	insights	on	future	
trends.		Evidence	from	digital	G2P	initiatives	around	the	world	highlights	the	key	operational	aspects	
that	 all	 stakeholders	 involved	 in	 running	 the	 programmes	 (State,	 FSPs)	 have	 to	 face	 in	 order	 to	
ensure	 a	 smooth	 and	 efficient	 running	 of	 the	 system.	 Operational	 requirements	 and	 issues	 are	
pertinent	to	the	physical	infrastructure	for	both	telecommunication	and	cash	distribution;	and	to	the	
network	of	agents	in	charge	of	performing	basic	operations	and,	according	to	the	operators’	vision,	
accompanying	 the	 G2P	 beneficiaries	 along	 the	 customer	 journey,	 from	 OTC	 cash	 withdrawal	 to,	
possibly,	the	opening	of	a	mobile	wallet	to	execute	more	advanced	operations	(BMGF,	2016).	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 awareness	 among	 policymakers	 that	 current	 regulatory	
frameworks	 are	 inadequate	 to	 address	 issues	 of	 customer	 protection,	 as	 the	 technological	
infrastructures	laid	out	by	FSPs	allow	increasingly	extensive	data	harvesting.			
	
Further	 research	 should	 follow	 up	 on	 the	 outcomes	 of	 current	 pilot	 projects	 to	 examine	 adoption	
rates	 of	 formal	 financial	 services	 among	 digital	 cash	 transfer	 recipients,	 including	 gender	 and	
geographic	 breakdowns,	 and	 whether	 divergence	 between	 the	 state	 and	 FSP	 in	 the	 notion	 of	
inclusion	 leads,	paradoxically,	 to	 the	exclusion	of	poor	who	appear	 less	 likely	 to	 shift	 from	cash	 to	
DFS.	 Eventually,	 the	 growing	 datafication	 of	 social	 protection	 programmes	 raises	 question	 on	 the	
changing	relationship	between	the	state	and	the	private	sector	in	charge	of	collecting	and	processing	
personal	data	that	render	citizens	more	‘legible’	to	corporate	actors	than	to	the	state.				
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